tual equipment tries to represent the postmodern world, he suggests, the result is as disastrous as those that would be encountered by a relatively simple natural organism given to mimetic camouflage and trying to approximate the op art laser dimensionality of a science-fictional environment of the far future. [1991:372] Jameson proposes this chameleon image to differentiate his understanding of the fragmented subject from that offered by Deleuze and Guattari (1977) of a new psychological type: "the ideal schizophrenic-that psychic subject who 'perceives' by way of difference and differentiation alone" (1991:345). Jameson's alternative is that we do not need to imagine "some unimaginably complex new internal human nature" (1991:372); instead, the psychological effects Deleuze and Guattari expect could be the result of older cognitive equipment trying to model a new world.
Still, he sums up the psychic results of late capitalism as "postmodern schizo-fragmentation," a result that seems inevitable, if it is true that "We" thus turn out to be whatever we are in, confront, inhabit, or habitually move through, provided it is understood that under current conditions we are obliged to renegotiate all those spaces or channels back and forth ceaselessly in a single Joycean day. [1991:373] The only mixing of information across these "spaces or channels" occurs randomly. An image of it is provided by Vargas Llosa's remarkable "memoir" of the old days of the radio serials in Latin American, La Tia Julia y el [E]Scribidor, where the separate daytime programs slowly begin to infect each other and colonize their neighbors, amalgamating in the most alarming-but as we have just seen, the most archetypically postmodern-of ways: such interfection is then the very prototype of what we may call the postmodern mode of totalizing. [1991:373] The end of a coherent self means, for Jameson, the end as well of both a personal style and of emotions:
The end of the bourgeois ego, or monad, no doubt brings with it the end of the psychopathologies of that ego-what I have been calling the waning of affect. But it means the end of much more-the end, for example, of style, in the sense of the unique and the personal, the end of the distinctive individual brush stroke (as symbolized by the emergent primacy of mechanical reproduction). As for expression and feelings or emotions, the liberation, in contemporary society, from the older anomie of the centered subject may also mean not merely a liberation from anxiety but a liberation from every other kind of feeling as well, since there is no longer a self present to do the feeling. [1991:15] Jameson does not celebrate schizo-fragmentation. The simultaneous availability of so much information opens up a means for constructing false consciousness which is tactically far more advanced than older and more primitive tactics of lying and repression and can do without the now cumbersome and Ptolemaic technologies of classical ideology. .. . The superiority of the new method lies in its capacity to coexist perfectly adequately with information and full knowledge, something already implicit in the separation of subsystems and topics in various unrelated parts of the mind, which can only be activated locally or contextually ... in distinct moments of time and by various unrelated subject positions. [1991:375] To put it into terms I introduced in another context (Strauss 1990 ), Jameson's view is that there has been a shift in the form of false consciousness from an older vertical containment to a newer horizontal containment. In the situation of vertical containment, consciousness formed by one's lived daily experience is implicit and hard to express, buried beneath the well-learned formulations taken from dominant ideologies.8 If Jameson is right about postmodern consciousness, that older form of false consciousness (explicit lies covering implicit truth) has been replaced by horizontal containment.9 In this form of false consciousness, lies and truth are internalized in separate cognitive compartments and neither is buried or hard to express, but the discrepant pieces cannot be brought face-to-face so that the truth can defeat the lies because there is no unified subject in whose awareness these multiple representations could meet. The political effects Jameson expects are confusion or cynicism (1991:274) and passivity.
Notice the parallels Jameson draws between the characteristics of postmodern cultural products on the one hand, and postmodern consciousness on the other: depthlessness (e.g., the waning of affect), lack of historicity, and incoherence. These parallels are not accidental:
If, indeed, the subject has lost its capacity ... to organize its past and future into coherent experience, it becomes difficult enough to see how the cultural productions of such a subject could result in anything but "heaps of fragments." [1991:25] In other words, late capitalism creates fragmented selves who then produce postmodern culture (both art and theory). Although Jameson's primary concern is with the first and last terms of this causal sequence (late capitalism and postmodern culture), his theoretical framework gives a crucial mediating role to the middle term-to psychological fragmentation, the form of personality, perception, and cognition specific to this historical period. 10 Before going on, it is important to highlight two points. First, Jameson is a theorist of the postmodern rather than a postmodern theorist (to use a distinction he made) (1991:15). Thus, he does not reject unifying explanations-in fact, one of his goals is to show that attacks on systems like Marxism are products of our time rather than timeless truths. Nor does he rule out the presence of a formerly "centered subject." Second, his expectation is that psychological fragmentation is quite widespread, at least in the United States, if not elsewhere in the world at present. " This is so even though some of the aspects of late capitalism he cites affect some people more than others. For example, academics with tenure have unusually secure jobs, while for many women, immigrants, ethnic minorities, and young people, insecure jobs are not a radical new development.12 At one point he does note that postmodernism "in the more limited sense of an ethos and a 'lifestyle' ... is the expression of the 'consciousness"' of the "professional-managerial class" (or "yuppies") (1991:407). That does not mean, however, that psychological fragmentation is confined to yuppies any more than moder forms of consciousness were confined to the entrepreneurs whose ethos and "lifestyle" dominated an earlier stage of capitalism. Thus Jameson uses catch-all terms such as "the subject in consumer or late monopoly capitalism" (1981:124) ; "the human subjects who happen into this new space" (1991:38); "the subject" (1991:25); or simply "we" (e.g., 1991:27) to describe the bearers of postmodern fragmentation.
Sherry Ortner takes Jameson to task for assuming that postmodern fragmentation is equally prevalent across classes in the United States. In Ortner's formulation, fragmentation and flattening are not general effects but are concentrated among those who are disadvantaged in this society. As Ortner puts it, He [Jameson] is inclined to see all the inhabitants of late capitalist societies as victims of postmodernist disruption and flattening, and I think this is true in certain limited areas, particularly in the realm of consumer culture. But Jameson never arrives at what is to me is the central, essentially Foucauldian, point: that the decentering and flattening of subjectivity, and the disruption of both pastness and futureness, are specifically effects of power. Fragmented identities are not equally distributed over the social landscape, even in late capitalism, nor is the inability to formulate and enact one's own projects, to narrate oneself as both a product of a coherent past and an agent of an imaginable future. [1991:5] Ortner uses Elliot Liebow's Tally's Corner (1967) and her own analysis of Grimms' fairy tales to argue that poor African Americans in the United States and women (in Europe and the United States?) are especially subject to a "rupturing of narrativity" (1991:6-7,10-11). In what follows, I will consider whether this alternative formulation holds up any better than Jameson's.
Looking for Postmodern Subjects
This, then, is how we would recognize Jamesonian postmodern fragmented selves if we were to meet any. They would have little genuine historical awareness and not use the life course as a narrative device. Also, they would be aware of multiple, diverse bits of information or opinions, among which they could switch rapidly but which they could not integrate into a meaningful whole; any mixtures of these separated bits would be random. Above all, they would appear to be the product of conflicting social influences, with nothing one could call a cognitive center of interpretation that imposes a personal style in appropriating information ("the end of the bourgeois ego or monad ... means the end ... of style, in the sense of the unique and the personal" [Jameson 1991:15] (They may also have hoped to escape the controversy the Rhode Island plant had aroused as the state's worst industrial water polluter and a source of noxious air pollutants.) I interviewed the plant's neighbors and employees to ascertain how their political-economic beliefs were affected by their experiences with the plant and its parent company. The very topic of my research, therefore, was the sort of dislocation caused by multinational capitalism that Jameson describes. Before I began those interviews, I studied the history of local protests over the Ciba-Geigy plant and interviewed key actors in those protests. Some of my interviewees had been active in those protests, so I knew about them through newspaper reports and others' descriptions as well as through their own words.
Of these 15 interviewees, I will focus primarily on Jim Lovett, a neighbor of the Ciba-Geigy plant and a former welder, now in his late sixties.'4 I chose Lovett because in an earlier article (Strauss 1990 ) I used his discourse as a prime example of horizontal containment. That is, he holds discrepant ideas that are equally easy for him to express but that he typically voices in distinct contexts. If Lovett does not fit Jameson's model of postmodern consciousness, it is not clear who does. Furthermore, Lovett was the most eloquent and voluble person I interviewed. Images of space, time, persons, and society that were vividly conveyed in Lovett's talk are less obvious in the discourse of my other interviewees.
After presenting his case in detail, I will introduce Carol Russo, a school secretary in her fifties. Russo, who keenly felt the lack of respect that came with growing up female in a family that expected little of girls, seems a good example to begin testing Ortner's expectation of a rupture of narrativity among marginalized peoples.
There may be objections to my using people in their fifties and sixties to test theories about postmodern consciousness.'5 These are not objections Jameson is entitled to make, since his description is supposed to apply generally to "the subject in consumer or late monopoly capitalism" or "the human subjects who happen into this new space." Still, we could allow that he may have been presciently describing an emerging form of consciousness that is more likely to be found among younger than among older U.S. Americans. To counter this objection, I will include the examples of two interviewees in their twenties, Anna Monteiro and Matthew Healey. Monteiro and Healey were both college graduates working in dead-end jobs at the time I interviewed them, but were planning further education that would lead to professional or business careers. They participated in a series of interviews I began in 1995 in Rhode Island and North Carolina on the topic of welfare reform. As was the case in the Ciba-Geigy study, my interviews were open-ended, although less extensive: in this case, I conducted two interviews per person, each about an hour and a half long. Interviewees were chosen to maximize diversity from a larger group of respondents in a random-sample phone survey.
A final objection that could be made to what follows is that my method of in-depth interviews already assumes a centered subject.'6 But Ewing (1990) uses the same method to argue that wholeness is only an illusion. I think the charge of question-begging applies even more forcefully to studies of fragmented selves that are based entirely on evidence drawn from public culture. These studies take for granted that which needs to be shown: that we are nothing more than the reflection of the cultural environment that "we are in, confront, inhabit, or habitually move through" (Jameson 1991:373). At present, we have too many discussions of postmodern subjectivities that do not come within handshaking distance of any putatively postmodern people. The problem with such discussions is that we cannot understand exactly how selves are constructed by society and how their consciousness is reflected in their public productions if our only source of information about selves is the social context and cultural productions themselves. Obviously all three (political-economic relations, psyches, and cultural productions) are closely related, but the exact nature of their relationship is not so clear-and not likely to be clarified by cultural studies that avoid a closer look at the middle term in this series.
In what follows, I will consider in two parts whether there are any postmodern fragmented selves in Jameson's sense. First, I will show that Lovett expresses discrepant cognitive schemas that derive from inconsistent social discourses. In the second part, however, I will show that (1) each of Lovett's schemas shows a personal way of appropriating the social discourse from which it was derived, something that is easier to see when his talk is compared with that of Carol Russo; (2) both Lovett and Russo have one schema that partly integrates the others I describe; (3) in both cases, the schema that brings about this partial integration can be traced to emotionally significant early life experiences, which Lovett and Russo talked about in ways that show them linking their past to their present; and (4) partial integration can be seen as well for two younger interviewees, Anna Monteiro and Matthew Healey. Age made no difference for my findings. Neither did class (Healey's family is upper-middleclass, while the others are working-class), ethnicity, or color (Monteiro is a black Cape Verdean American while the others are white Euro-Americans).
Theories Meet People, Part I: Evidence for the Partly Fragmented Self Since cognitive schemas do not offer themselves up for our direct inspection, what do I take as evidence for their integration or lack thereof? My assump-tion has been that a given schema is expressed in a "voice" that is distinguishable by its key words, imagery conveyed in metaphors, typical contexts of expression, and emotional valence (Bakhtin 1981; Strauss 1992 This comment is very perceptive. Methodologically, what it suggests is that it is not significant if someone talks about the end of a romantic relationship in a different voice than he or she uses to talk about what they are having for dinner: nobody would take this as evidence of postmodern psychological fragmentation. It is much more telling if someone speaks about roughly the same topic in very different ways, depending on the context, using voices that offer widely discrepant ways of representing a given situation. These are discrepancies from the observer's perspective that might also appear as such to the interviewee. In fact, I found that discrepancies did sometimes become apparent to my interviewees, contrary to Jameson's expectation that the postmodern subject cannot bring "subsystems and topics in various unrelated parts of the mind" (1991:375) into awareness at the same time.17
Lovett's Discrepant Cognitive Schemas
Jim Lovett has been subject to many of the forms of disorientation Jameson describes. Several years before I met him, he had been forced out of work by an occupational disability caused by inadequate ventilation in another local factory, where he had been a welder of exotic metals. Also, Lovett was unable to read for most of his life, only learning after his forced retirement. Thus, he was more dependent for information from television and radio than most people are. I learned about him through my earlier case study of the neighborhood protests over the Ciba-Geigy plant; newspaper reports, interviews with other people, and his own journals showed him to have been very active as a demonstrator, speaker at hearings, and source of frequent telephone complaints to the local plant, whose emissions left him almost suffocated.
Three distinct schemas seemed to underlie much of Lovett's discussions with me about his life, his work, the fight he carried on with Ciba-Geigy, and many other topics that occurred to him as we talked. These schemas struck me as discrepant because they contained disparate self-representations, as well as clashing models of individual agency, society, and historical progress or as the voices that express those schemas. Since the schemas can only be inferred from the voices, I will present evidence for these different voices before I discuss how the schemas expressed by these voices were shaped and how they are related to each other.
Lovett's Can'tfight the system voice. In the first three interviews, I asked Lovett about the work that left him disabled and about his dealings with CibaGeigy. The interviews were loosely structured around a set of topics I discussed with everyone, but I encouraged interviewees to speak as long as they wanted and to go on to other topics that seemed to them to be related. Lovett participated enthusiastically, moving from Ciba-Geigy to big business in general, his own employers, rich people, crooked politicians, criminals, and welfare abusers. Consistently, he spoke of the way the hard-working average person is exploited by lazy and corrupt bureaucrats, politicians, and businessmen, whom he castigated In passage 7, global corporate expansion ("They're all over the world") is a sign of success and is viewed favorably ("It's tremendous"). In passages 6 through 8 there is no social contextualization of the possibilities for individual achievement; all that is necessary is to have an idea (passage 7) and to want something enough (passage 8). In response to another question, Lovett repeated a slogan he had learned as an Amway salesman: "You can achieve anything your mind can conceive" (1985,6:17). All of his stories when he spoke in this voice were of individual success. These narratives were ones of linear progress and had a short temporal horizon, limited to a person's lifetime, unlike the descriptions of endless repeating cycles over long time spans when Lovett was speaking in his Can'tfight the system voice. Perhaps it is not surprising that Lovett would talk about child-rearing in a different voice than he talked about class conflict or entrepreneurship. But Lovett used his Feeling responsiblefor others voice, stressing caring and responsibility within a somewhat patriarchal family model, to talk about more than private families-it carried over to the "work family" and even the "national family." In the next example, Lovett makes allowances for a manager once he thinks of the manager as being like a husband.
[Lovett was talking about his former employer] I had one job-was a stainless
steel cooling section? It got twisted, in fabricating, because it-the clamp that I was using-failed. It had to be cut in half and then made into two units instead of one long one. That's all they remembered-the mistake I made. The one mistake in 30 years! They kept throwing it up to me. Never, ever giving me congratulations or praise for going in there, working three nights in a row until well after midnight. Nothing. They always remembered the thing, the mistake you made, never the good things you do. Responsible is ambiguous: it can mean reliable and dependable, but it can also mean carrying the burden of obligation for something. Lovett voiced that sense of burden particularly in agonizing about how much he should support his sister-in-law and brother: his brother had been a heavy drinker for many years and could no longer work. Lovett also became irritated when it seemed that his children, in-laws, and friends took advantage of the fact that he was not working or asked for advice that they then ignored. Still, unlike the resentment and pessimism that dominated his Can't fight the system voice and the optimistic enthusiasm of his Achieving anything you want voice, the overall affective tone of Lovett's Feeling responsible for others voice was one of contentment, a term he used when I asked him to describe himself: Finally, Lovett's Feeling responsible for others voice also has readily available social sources. Young people are often admonished about the need to become responsible adults; women who go on welfare are told they need to show more "personal responsibility." The stress on personal responsibility in the debate about welfare shows the influence of individualistic discourses, but there are still differences between talk about "the individual" and more communitarian discourses about "responsibility." To talk about responsibility is to stress duty, especially, duties toward others.24 This is not the giddy, you-canreach-for-the-stars, self-centered attitude of the economic individualist; responsibilities pull you to the ground and can keep you from getting ahead. Many of my interviewees (male as well as female) had faced situations in which they had to choose between economic advancement and spending time with their families or aging parents (see also Stack 1996) . In addition to public discourse for mass audiences, other sources of Lovett's ideas about being a responsible family man could have been parental lectures, overheard gossip (about irresponsible relatives, neighbors, and acquaintances), and observation of his role models' behaviors. 25 Thus far, in other words, Jim Lovett fits Jameson's depiction of the fragmented subject constructed by diverse social discourses.
Theories Meet People, Part II: Evidence for the Partly Integrated Self
In other respects, however, Jameson's depiction misses the mark for Lovett and my other interviewees. Lovett's schemas are not mere replicas of dominant discourses but are his reworked versions of these, which becomes apparent when his schemas are compared with Carol Russo's; Lovett's and Russo's outlooks both show partial integration; their partial integrations can be traced to emotionally significant early life experiences, which they can talk about in a way that links their past and present; and the same pattern of partial fragmentation and partial integration holds for two younger interviewees, Anna Monteiro and Matthew Healey.
Personal Style: Schemas Do Not Replicate Discourses
The end of the bourgeois ego or monad ... means the end ... of style, in the sense of the unique and the personal.
-Jameson, "The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism" I have acknowledged that Lovett's Can't fight the system, Achieving anything you want, and Feeling responsible for others schemas were drawn, respectively, from populist, economic individualist, and communitarian pronouncements and practices. Yet as Lovett voices those ideas, it is clear he has a unique style-that is, his own way of appropriating and interpreting those widely shared discourses. In his appropriation of populist discourses, for example, the If, indeed, the subject has lost its capacity actively to extend its pro-tensions and re-tensions across the temporal manifold and to organize its past and future into coherent experience, it becomes difficult enough to see how the cultural productions of such a subject could result in anything but "heaps of fragments" and in a practice of the randomly heterogeneous.... As for expression and feelings or emotions, the liberation, in contemporary society, from the older anomie of the centered subject may also mean not merely a liberation from anxiety but a liberation from every other kind of feeling as well, since there is no longer a self present to do the feeling.
-Jameson, "The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism"
The partial consistencies I found for Lovett around the Feeling responsible for others schema and for Russo around the Being hurt by people on top schema are reflected as well in the number of different contexts in which those ideas were voiced. Lovett's Feeling responsible for others voice was much more widely distributed across interview contexts than either his Can'tfight the system or Achieving anything you want voices, occurring at some point in every interview. By contrast, his Can'tfight the system voice was most apparent in the first three interviews and his Achieving anything you want voice was not heard at all until the fourth interview. The same is true of Russo's Being hurt by people on top voice: it was recurrent across the interviews I had with her (and across time, showing up in both the 1984 and the 1990 interviews).
Furthermore, Lovett acted on his Feeling responsible for others ideas much more than on his Can'tfight the system or Achieving anything you want ideas. If I had heard only his Can'tfight the system voice, I never would have guessed that he was one of the most active neighbors in the Ciba-Geigy protests. He marched, attended state hearings, and called the plant manager regularly. His Achieving anything you want voice was also misleading. Despite his enthusiasm about the opportunities to make money with Amway, he and his wife only sold enough to cover their costs. At an earlier stage of his life, he had considered moving to Connecticut, where there were companies that would pay welders a higher wage, but he felt that he and Irene should remain near their parents as they grew older. That is only one example of behavior consistent with his Feeling responsible for others ideas. During the interviews at his house he was often on the phone with relatives who needed advice, and when I interviewed one of his relatives, she attested to his helpfulness. (I saw this for myself when he showed up unexpectedly to make some repairs in the middle of one of the interviews with her.)27 One way Russo acted on her concern for children was by fighting for better schools in Cranston and volunteering to tutor in them. She was also an extremely protective mother. Yet while she took pride in being an involved, protective mother, she counseled her daughters not to center their lives on their families. Passage 30 is particularly interesting because in it Lovett contrasts his involvement with his children with both his father's and his brother's lack of involvement with their children. We could speculate that Lovett has strong negative feelings about his father that he hides ("But I know that he cared," 31), displacing them instead onto his brother. More generally, it seems that the repeated occurrences of Lovett's Feeling responsible for others theme, across a wide variety of contexts, is rooted in the emotionally salient early childhood experience of yearning for his father to be involved in the family.
I don't want my
Russo as well provides many clues about the roots of her concern for children and women who are victims of violence and indifference. In this project, I always begin the second interview by asking people to tell me "some of the major experiences that have made you the kind of person you are." Monteiro's first response was, "Being raised in two different cultures," which led to a clash between her immigrant parents' values and those she had learned growing up in the United States.
Monteiro had a strong Cape Verdean identity. She was proud that she could speak the language and that her son understood it, she was active in local Cape Verdean affairs, and she was interested in getting a computer so she could visit And she saw classical conditioning at work with her father. Being popular and attractive, along with having a close, supportive family, all probably contributed to the self-esteem she attributed to herself. In talking about her relationship with her abusive ex-fiance, she said, "I never ever thought it was my fault. Self-esteem has never been a problem for me" (1995,1:1 1). In sum, threading through much of Monteiro's talk is a sense of someone who approaches life with optimism and self-confidence. This voice is not constant, but it provides a partial integration of the diverse ideas she has internalized. Matthew Healey. Healey was a few years younger than Monteiro when I interviewed him for the study of attitudes about welfare. Unlike Monteiro, he was one of the people who had fallen into my earlier phone survey by chance, through a random sampling of greater Providence phone exchanges.29 After many calls, I managed to catch him between a trip to Europe and his departure for graduate school. Unlike Monteiro, whose family was working-class, Healey's family was middle-to upper-middle class, and he lived in a town with a reputation for snobbishness.
I told him my mother has him trained. She did not intend on it but that's what it
Many of Healey's answers to my questions about welfare and related topics reflected the discussions he had had with his friends about those issues. I always begin these interviews by asking people if they have a general approach to issues Healey's religious faith probably contributed to his outlook on several issues, such as premarital sex. He is opposed to abortion, and when I followed up on that topic, asking him to imagine a situation in which his girlfriend became pregnant accidentally and he was faced with the possibility of supporting the child, he had a hard time doing so because he is also opposed to premarital sex. Another factor that has shaped Healey's outlooks is having worked for pay since he was 16:
I've been in a situation
49. I've worked since the day I was 16. I did landscaping. Very humbling because I would be cutting grass for kids that I went to school with. While they, you know. And I, of course, I thought that was strange at first. But I was earning money and that money was saved. That was an important lesson. My father felt that that was very important. And at first of course I was, "I want to be out with my friends," and this and that. But I do look back now and it was a very valuable experience. Healey's international outlook went far beyond this. He had studied European history in college and was very knowledgeable about the historical background of current world events, such as the conflict in Bosnia. And he could speak four European languages. On his recent trip to Europe, he had tried to judge the extent to which Nazi beliefs were still widespread in Germany by talking to Germans of all ages in German and listening to their offhand comments, for example, on the German-language tour at the concentration camp at Dachau. Still, as was the case for Lovett, Russo, and Monteiro, there was an outlook that partly integrated Healey's diverse ideas. This could be called Listening from the margins, and Healey traces it to his having been overweight as a child. In sum, while Healey's ideas and actions cannot all be traced to his Listening from the margins schema, it does partly integrate the ideas he has drawn from television, his friends, and the other people he has listened to and learned from.
Coherence Manufactured on the Spot? Earlier, I claimed that there are two plausible ways of explaining the partial coherences I found for Russo and Lovett between past events and present outlooks: that emotionally significant past experiences had shaped the schemas that dominated their adult narratives, or that current experiences had shaped the schemas through which they remembered the past. This ignores a third possibility: the partial coherences I found for Lovett, Russo, Monteiro, and Healey were created through the interaction between us during the interviews. Linde (1993) writes about the social obligation of speakers and addressees to jointly create life stories with the right amount of causal coherence. (The right amount, that is, in the United States. She discusses cross-cultural variation in the amount and type of coherence that is expected in narratives.) Furthermore, I had asked my interviewees to tell me "some of the major experiences that have made you the kind of person you are," thereby asking them to make a coherent connection between their past and present.
Lovett's responsible family man persona was an identity that he was proud of and, I suspect, foregrounded in our discussions in preference to other identities that reflected less well on him: "I feel so, that with my education, which was only to the 9th grade, I've been fairly successful, um ... raising my family" (passage 9). He had not been especially successful as a breadwinner, and the mention of his education at the beginning of the sentence (relevant to breadwinning, irrelevant to parenting), followed by a pause, suggests a midsentence decision to switch to a different meaning of success than the one with which he had started. Also, this statement came early in the interviews, appearing on pages 2 to 3 of the transcript for the first interview. Although I did not direct him toward that identification, my presence in the interview context may have led him to highlight it. Possibly the same is true for Monteiro's Learning from my experiences schema.
Healey, however, tried to foreground a different identity than the one he eventually presented of a marginalized, formerly overweight person. In the beginning, he kept presenting himself as someone who "looks at the facts." This was his response to my leadoff question in the first interview, and it recurred throughout that interview. He did not bring up his having been overweight until about a half an hour into the second interview. And he did so not in response to my "tell me some of the major experiences that have made you the kind of person you are" question, but in response to a later invitation to talk about "what kind of kid you were growing up." Similarly, Russo was very reluctant to talk about her unhappy childhood; I did not learn about it until six years after I first met her, during the second round of interviews I conducted with her in 1990. The identity she kept highlighting was being a mother. I had made a point from the beginning to let her know that I was a mother too, which may have contributed to her emphasis on this identity.
More important, the evidence I gave above for partial coherence consisted not only of self-descriptions and consciously claimed identities but also of repetitions of key words, metaphorical imagery, emotional tone, and other aspects of their voices that were unlikely to have been produced for deliberate effect. For example, my claim that Feeling responsiblefor others partly integrated Lovett's talk rests not on his explicit identity as a responsible parent but on passages like 25, where phrases like "responsible people to see that their family is cared for," "he only cares for his class," and "is stagnant in his line" hinted that his Feeling responsiblefor others schema was active in the midst of a Can' tfight the system context. Nor does it make sense that Russo would have used a lot of violent imagery, like "step on you" and "crush you," because she wanted to give the impression of being someone who expects to be hurt by people in power. That is not the kind of coherence that Linde thinks is socially expected and it is not an identity of which Russo was proud.
Finally, my analysis also rested on evidence about people's actions. Lovett, for example, has acted in accordance with his Feeling responsible for others schema; just as Russo has for her Being hurt by people on top schema, Monteiro has for her Learning from my experiences schema, and Healey has for his Listening from the margins schema. None of these actions were manufactured on the spot.
Conclusions
In sum, I hope I have shown that in part Jameson is right, speaking about U.S. Americans near the end of the 20th century, that they internalize diverse public discourses, which they sometimes compartmentalize as if they had been "assigned to different floors and different office buildings." This was especially the case for Lovett and true, to a lesser extent, for Russo, Monteiro, and Healey as well. For example, when Healey talked about his Star Trek idealism, he talked about a world where "everyone is provided for" (passage 50), but when I asked him what needed to be changed in the welfare system, he talked about his high school friends who were just given their spending money instead of earning it, as he had, and he focused on the importance of the work ethic.
In other respects, Jameson is wrong. For example, no two of my interviewees internalized social discourses in quite the same way, showing that personal style is not a property of some bygone bourgeois individual. For example, while Lovett's version of populism stressed the difficulties of the workingman-homeowner, Russo's version focused on the repression of women, children, and other people described as good but weak. This concern for the innocent and weak may help explain Russo's opposition to abortion. In this she sounds like some of the pro-life women interviewed by Ginsburg (1989)-except that unlike Ginsburg's interviewees, Russo believed it was a mistake for women to center their lives on their families.
Nor were multiple schemas necessarily related to political passivity for these interviewees. Lovett came to my attention originally because he was one of the Ciba-Geigy neighbors most active in the neighborhood protests over the plant, and Russo had participated in efforts to improve the city schools. Although Healey and Monteiro had not been especially politically active when I interviewed them, neither could be described as bewildered or apathetic: both discussed current issues knowledgeably and with feeling. Healey's and Russo's opposition to abortion, moreover, are a reminder that passionate adherents to a cause are hardly absent from the landscape of the late-20th-century United States. (Think also of the militias now active in the United States.) Cultural critics like Jameson who describe apathy and cynicism may be overly fixated on the fate of the political Left, overlooking the energy and commitment of activists on the political Right at this time.
Central to my argument has been the point that Jameson's description of late capitalist psychological fragmentation misses the extent to which fragmentation coexists with some integration. Thus, the content father and husband of Lovett's Feeling responsible for others talk seemed, at least at times, to blend into the resentful workingman of his Can't fight the system narratives. Similarly, Russo's Manichean world view, Monteiro's self-confidence, and Healey's feel-ing of being in a lower or marginal position threaded through each one's talk, giving them greater coherence than would be expected from the diverse sources upon which each one drew. This is no less true for Healey or Monteiro, both in their twenties, than for Russo in her fifties or Lovett in his sixties. Nor was there any difference by class, gender, ethnicity, or color-at least for these four interviewees-which suggests problems with Ortner's expectation of greater fragmentation among subaltern groups in this society.30
Four people is not very many, and it is possible that Jameson and Ortner are describing general trends that could be found if we were to look at a larger group.31 My expectation is that the pattern I found will hold up, not only among other U.S. Americans but elsewhere, given a cognitive model that I hold (Strauss and Quinn in press). According to this model, some cognitive fragmentation is to be expected because there is no central sorter in anybody's head that files information logically. Instead, new experiences and ideas are internalized in connection only with information that is similar in learning context, key words, emotional tone, or other perceptible features-abstract semantic similarity is not enough.32 Yet partial coherence is to be expected, because feelings have not been obliterated under late capitalism. We are still emotional beings, concerned about safety, status, and love, among other things. Repeated events that arouse these strong emotions create schemas that are likely to be used to interpret ambiguous new experiences more often than schemas that carry less emotional force. This, of course, is hardly a new discovery, although it has received some fresh support in recent psychological research (Caspi, Elder, and Herbener 1990; Shoda, Mischel, and Peake 1990, cited in Westen n.d.).
A more general moral for us, as anthropologists, is to be wary of analyses of consciousness that rest largely on the evidence of high culture, such as the music of John Cage or the architecture of John Portman. These productions are honed over time to satisfy elite cultural critics, who (at least at this time and in the United States) are often looking for something new. Theories and art works that reject older forms of unity and coherence are being rewarded now; in a few years, if it is not happening already, pastiche will no longer be novel and coherence will be fresh and exciting. Meanwhile, people will go on telling their stories and relating their ideas orally with about as much coherence and incoherence as long-standing cultural conventions and the workings of their brains allow in the milliseconds available between sentences.
This does not mean that changes in the global economy, rapid information transfers, decline of civic associations, and other features of late-20th-century political economy in the United States and elsewhere have had no psychological effects. Anthropologists can make an enormous contribution by studying these effects comparatively, which will help us go beyond rhetoric about postmodern selves and answer questions about precisely who is being affected, how, and why. These questions cannot be answered, however, without the fieldwork we do better than nonanthropological practitioners of cultural studies (see Moffatt 1990) . I like Ulf Hannerz's comment about this: This is not the sort of internal amalgamation we will see in passage 25, however, even if it is a good example of the way people can bring discrepant schemas to mind simultaneously, showing that persons are more than a collection of subject positions.
27. Putting it into terms from Strauss (1992) , I would say Lovett had a personal semantic network that encompassed his Feeling responsible for others schema. I still think Achieving anything you want is a verbal molecule for him. The status of Can't fight the system is less clear: it is like a verbal molecule in not being very motivating, but he has put it into his voice. Bakhtin (1981) would call it an example of making another's word one's own.
28. The transcription of the second interview with Monteiro was abbreviated, so passages that appear on the same page might in fact have been separated by several minutes.
29. The Greater Providence area in which I was sampling for the Rhode Island part of the study covers much of that small state, from Bristol on the east side of Narragansett Bay, to Cumberland and Smithfield to the north, Foster to the west, and North Kingstown to the southwest. 30. Ortner may not mean the same thing as Jameson when she talks about fragmentation. Her emphasis was on the "rupturing of narrativity." Her discussion, drawing on the fate of heroines of Grimms' fairy tales and Liebow's (1967) description of poor African American men, explains a rupture of narrativity not as the inability to mentally link past, present, and future (it is hard to speculate about Gretel's abilities in that area), but as being "denied the possibility of enacting or even formulating projects of self-creation, self-realization, self-respect" (1991:7 
